The Narrowly Focused and Geopolitically-Driven Role of MAGA
A tale of global geopolitical realignment, democratic backsliding, and realpolitik amidst a looming threat to the world order, told from the rise of Trump
Intro: This is a semi-private blog post. I don't allow clicks or interactions that will promote the post. My purpose is to share a theory with just a few people. My criteria are various people I’ve known with diverse political perspectives who are also both geopolitically inclined and might otherwise offer a nuanced perspective. My intent isn’t to persuade you but to test a geopolitical theory of mine and I want a snapshot of November 2023 to see how it pans out. I’m asking you because I think you’ll help keep me honest with constructive and insightful feedback (including telling me I'm nuts).
Importantly, nothing here is from information or access I had at my previous job, and my reasoning for this characterization and assessment is from the same information the general public has access to. I’ve never worked anywhere with a mission focused anywhere near this.
The majority of people I share this with disagree with me on most or all of it. Perhaps we all assumed The End of History because we lived in a world for 70+ years where things were relatively predictable. Or perhaps I’m just plain wrong. I simply argue that the power balance may change with the times and we should expect surprises along the way because the calculus we use to approach global events may change along with it.
The intent isn't to stoke a Trump-Biden political debate. I've tried to share this theory from a politically neutral perspective as best I can. You may find that I present Trump as a relatively small player in this. I'd argue, from his perspective, that money and wealth come later, as success means he will be remembered as a consequential and revered historical figure. I mean to convey this as happening in parallel as the driving force of recent domestic and geopolitical events, not in place. It's more of a "top-down" strategic view, and your present-day perceptions of Trump or Biden can still exist from this vantage point, albeit within the context of a broader geopolitical strategy [currently] at the helm of the ship. I intend to merely make conjecture that this geopolitical focus may be among his most vital interests policy-wise (above most competing objectives) and he may have pursued this since the beginning. This is a New World Order conspiracy theory, after all.
Most people I share this with disagree with me on some or all of it. Maybe it’ll make more sense later—too many bitter pills to swallow for now. Perhaps we all assumed The End of History because we lived in a world for 70+ years where things were relatively predictable. Or perhaps I’m just plain wrong. I simply argue that the power balance may change with the times and potentially the calculus we use to approach global events may change along with it.
TL;DR Version: The gist of this theory begins with an emerging change to the world order, which may be driving many of the past decade's increasingly turbulent world events. I'm referring to a rising and expanding China and a global shift towards a multipolar world with multiple major and regional powers jockeying for position in a potentially upended global economy.
Against this backdrop, through a principled realism1-based 'America First'2 policy (Often emphasizing domestic affairs over global issues and multinational alliances), Trump has potentially discretely pursued and prioritized a strategic partnership with Russia, probably to the detriment of NATO and broader commitment to Western-style democracy and the current rules-based order. This agreement can potentially be further characterized as a de-facto geopolitical realignment of the US closer to Russia to avoid increasingly risky future geopolitical entanglements. This shift is also potentially a strategic move by Trump to preempt Russia (and the American left) from aligning closer with China economically and politically (possible examples: Democrats support entering into a new Trans-Pacific-Partnership economic bloc perceived as excessively favorable towards China and/or decreasing the US military footprint in the region).
Such a geopolitical shift would have significant implications for decades-old global alliances and relationships and this broader context may increase the stakes of current and future international conflicts.
Over the past decade, I've often felt that some peculiar geopolitical moments (and the US political situation) make a little more sense when viewed in this context. Potentially, this may even help us better understand somewhat recent domestic policy squabbles seemingly unrelated to geopolitics.
Edit: I fixed/edited some of the wording and incorporated feedback throughout November. I'll leave this 'as is' and check back in the future. Also, please glance at hyperlinks for more context.
Edit-Edit: To clarify, I used the term "partnership" as opposed to an alliance to signify a less formal agreement (similar-but-different example). Also included a better intro, summary, and formatting. I fixed a lot of grammar.
Over much of the past decade, elements of two (or perhaps more) world powers—the US (led by Trump) and Russia (led by Putin)—have likely discreetly pursued a strategic partnership, agreement, or pact upon the assumption the world is geopolitically realigning towards a multipolar world, with a rising China potentially achieving near-parity with the US as the world's preeminent power in the coming years/decades3.
Trump may perceive this relationship as necessary to counter growing Chinese influence in global (and domestic) foreign and economic policy, thereby necessitating a shift away from multilateral treaty obligations--and potentially also a broader commitment to Western-style Democracy and free trade--to an emphasis on domestic policy, homeland security, and defense of interests in the Indo-Pacific, Middle East, and abroad. This agreement also likely seeks to reestablish trade relations with Russia while mitigating the perceived high risk of a major conflict occurring between the two in the near to medium term.
Pursuing this deal between the US and Russia is potentially a vital national interest for Trump and Putin. This pursuit could lead to a de-facto geopolitical realignment of the two nations, potentially at the expense of many political, constitutional, defense, legal, electoral, and social norms, and other longstanding alliances and relationships the US has maintained since the Cold War. Notably, NATO, the EU, Israel, the current Sunni Arab governments, the Russian-led CSTO, and even the Japanese Self-Defense Forces may all face challenges in fitting into this new construct.
Because of the high priority placed on this agreement, Trump's unsuccessful 2020 bid for the Presidency and the heightened tensions surrounding significant ongoing US support for Ukraine may have merely slowed this pursuit, pending Trump regaining power following the 2024 Elections and an outcome in Ukraine acceptable to Putin and Russia.
The pursuit of this Trump-era agreement with Russia is likely actively opposed by a large segment of American politicians (such as President Biden and most of the Democratic party, and an ever-shrinking segment of the GOP), as numerous policies (e.g., the substantial military aid to Ukraine, NATO expansion, Russian economic sanctions, etc.) almost certainly work directly against the prospects of a successful relationship developing between the US and Russia.
Pursuing a relationship of this nature would likely have significant implications for geopolitics in the near to medium term. Over the next several years, we may continue to observe diminishing conservative support for US military aid to Ukraine, potentially resulting in Russian ground forces regaining the initiative and culminating in Republican-supported peace proposals yielding significant territorial concessions from Ukraine. Other conservative US policy shifts could include a reversal of Russian economic sanctions and a gradual decrease in support for NATO while maintaining a degree of support for present-day populist/authoritarian-leaning member states such as Turkey and Hungary.
Either party may also ultimately decide to withdraw from this venture and pursue other options (and the recent Russian arms deal with North Korea is hedging a step somewhere else, including further into alignment with China. The decades-old adage that North Korea may play China and Russia against each other may not always apply in the current climate). Russia likely perceives Ukraine as a necessary buffer against Western encroachment in support of Pan-Slavic responsibilities. Therefore, Russia considers an acceptable end-state in Ukraine among its most vital interests and a prerequisite to entering such a partnership. A change of leadership in Russia (or a prolonged failure of pro-Russian candidates to maintain power in the US government) may also alter the prospects of this pursuit.
Some additional food for thought:
In the scenario above, the Democrats (or, more broadly, the American left) may undergo their own transformation, potentially favoring some degree of gradually increased political and economic cooperation with China as a counter-balance against the GOP's emerging geopolitical realignment. I've steered clear of characterizing this for now because it's unclear to me if it's taken shape yet.
The elephant in the room is that China may attempt to unify (or reunify, invade, etc.) Taiwan—peacefully or otherwise in the coming years or decades. They may even be "getting ready to invade by 2027"4 (which is optimistic at best, and even the CIA doubts that timeline). Perhaps they are simply preparing to unify Taiwan once they can pose a credible threat and when an opportunity presents itself (i.e. when the US is increasingly preoccupied elsewhere). In that scenario, China could seek to establish air supremacy and a naval blockade of Taiwan to force their surrender, potentially without ground forces. In any case, Xi isn't getting any younger and is watching the situation in Ukraine closely.
The US's level of commitment to Taiwan's defense over the last 50 years is often unclear and strategically ambiguous at best. Therefore, I would argue that we shouldn't expect US military intervention in many Taiwan unification scenarios, but it's always possible. As we've seen in Ukraine, US military intervention is not required for the US to have a significant stake in the outcome.
One of the few usually consistent themes of US-Taiwan policy appears to be the goal of delaying or eliminating the threat of an all-out invasion of Taiwan through effective regional deterrence by the US military and its partners and allies; however, deterrence has arguably become increasingly unassured due to a rapidly modernizing China.
An attempt by China to unify Taiwan through non-peaceful means could create favorable conditions for other countries worldwide to settle longstanding territorial disputes. The US and its allies may lack adequate resources to continue responding to multiple conflicts simultaneously as they are focused on China, potentially even regardless of whether or not the US directly commits forces to Taiwan. These conditions could quickly escalate into a world war alongside some or all of the world's ongoing regional armed conflicts and flashpoints (e.g., Ukraine/Eastern Europe, Korea, the broader Middle East, the Caucasus, etc.). Some of the US's regional alliances and partnerships may be tested in such a scenario (including but not limited to the Philippines, Mongolia, and Singapore), as they may view cooperation with China as preferable to potential conflict. Even if the US commits to a non-interventionist Taiwan policy in the future, actually being neutral in such a conflict may prove extremely difficult.
I've steered mostly clear of characterizing Turkey, Israel, Iran, or the broader Middle East in any scenario above because that's a whole other rabbit hole. The Middle East is irreversibly linked to Ukraine in particular if only because the hectic US political/economic situation gives Hamas and Iran (and potentially Russia and China) a window of opportunity to accomplish broader goals. Now the US—during a turbulent election season and amid significant concerns on inflation, immigration, etc.—must choose between where exactly they're going to throw political, military, and financial resources (Europe or the Middle East… all the while trying to contain China in the Indo-Pacific) while the federal government is under constant threat of a shutdown (fiscal or otherwise). Iran and Russia didn't necessarily have advanced notice of the Oct 7th attack on Israel but are nonetheless likely planning their next steps with some degree of coordination (anecdotal, but the Hamas attack was on Putin's 71st birthday and ultimately helped take the steam out of Ukraine's [last?] major counter-offensive).
The current geopolitical situation incentivizes Russia and China (alongside other regional actors such as Iran/proxies and North Korea) to work together to create dilemmas for US foreign policy in the Middle East and elsewhere to draw American resources away from [potential] hot spots in Eastern Europe, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. With these issues unresolved, future Middle Eastern conflicts (and elsewhere) may continue to escalate alongside geopolitical events in Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific (or vice-versa down the line).